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Comments
An Analysis of Pennsylvania's Third Generation

Anti-Takeover Legislation
I.

INTRODUCTION

The Pennsylvania General Assembly recently enacted the Pennsylvania Business Corporation Law of 1988, which will take effect
on October 1, 1989.1 As part of this law, the legislature adopted
strict anti-takeover provisions which, unlike other provisions of the
law, became effective March 23, 1988. 2 Essentially, these provisions
offer protection to shareholders of corporations targeted by hostile
takeover bidders.3 In adopting these provisions, Pennsylvania
joined a growing number of states which have recently enacted new
anti-takeover statutes" in response to the United States Supreme
Court decision in CTS Corporation v. Dynamics Corporation of
America,5 which upheld the constitutionality of Indiana's Control
15 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1101 (Purdon Supp. 1989)(effective Oct. 1, 1989).
2. Act of March 23, 1988, No. 27, 1988 Pa. Laws 27 (to be codified at 15 PA. CONS.
STAT. ANN. §§ 2502, 2513, 2541-48 and 2551-56). This comment will, for the most part, deal
exclusively with §§ 2551-2556 since these are the primary anti-takeover provisions. Citations
herein will be to the title and section where the legislation will be codified.
3. Basically, these provisions are designed to eliminate freeze-outs, or "two-tiered"
tender offers, in which the bidder makes a tender offer for a certain percentage (often 51%)
of the shares of the target corporation with the express intention of "freezing-out" the remaining shares in a subsequent merger with the corporation at a substantially lower price.
The threat of these "two-tiered" tender offers often coerces shareholders into selling their
shares during the first step of the offer to avoid receiving substantially reduced consideration at a later stage. See CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., 107 S. Ct. 1637, 1645-46
(1987). This coercive aspect of the "two-tiered" tender offer has provided a significant
amount of the current momentum toward and justification for state anti-takeover legislation. See BNS, Inc. v. Koppers Co., 683 F. Supp. 458, 468 n.23 (1988).
4. Since January 1, 1988, a number of states, including Idaho, Kansas, Michigan, Nebraska, South Carolina, Tennessee, Virginia and Delaware have adopted anti-takeover legislation. See Lipman, Another Generation of Anti-Takeover Laws Beginning to Develop,
NAT'L L.J., Feb. 20, 1989, at S.18 [hereinafter Lipman]. Although referred to as "anti-takeover" statutes, these statutes do not prohibit corporate takeovers. Instead, they merely regulate takeover procedures in an effort to curb abusive takeover tactics.
5. 107 S. Ct. 1637 (1987). For a comprehensive analysis of the Supreme Court's decision, see Langevoort, The Supreme Court and the Politics of Corporate Takeovers: A Corn1.
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Share Acquisition statute." Prior to Dynamics, no state anti-takeover legislation withstood constitutional challenge in the Supreme
Court.1
In drafting the current crop of third generation s anti-takeover
statutes, some states predictably chose to adopt control share acquisition statutes modeled after the Indiana Act upheld in Dynamics, while several others adopted the Delaware approach of freezing certain business combinations between target corporations and
hostile bidders for a specified period of time, often referred to as
the "moratorium approach." Although similar in design to Delaware's newly enacted anti-takeover statute, 10 Pennsylvania's provisions, in many respects, are much more aggressive in nature. Thus,
this comment will explore the essential characteristics of Pennsylvania's anti-takeover provisions, the inherent distinctions between
these provisions and the Delaware statute, and the significance of
these distinctions in light of the Supreme Court's constitutional
analysis in Dynamics.
II.

HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF STATE ANTI-TAKEOVER
LEGISLATION

During the 1960's, cash tender offers grew in popularity as a
means for achieving corporate control.1" This growth in popularity
is often attributed to the fact that tender offers were beyond the
reach of the existing disclosure requirements of the federal securities laws. 12 Thus, target shareholders were at a distinct disadvanment on CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corporation of America, 101 HARV. L. REV. 96 (1987)
[hereinafter Langevoort].
6. IND. CODE ANN. §§ 23-1-42-1 - 23-1-42-11 (West Supp. 1987).
7. See Edgar v. Mite Corp., 457 U.S. 624 (1982) (Illinois Business Takeover Act invalidated on commerce clause grounds).
8. Statutes adopted after the Supreme Court decision in Dynamics are commonly
referred to as third generation statutes. Statutes enacted prior to the Supreme Court's decision in MITE are identified as first generation statutes, while statutes enacted after the
MITE decision and prior to Dynamics are often referred to as second generation statutes.
9. Although identified here as the Delaware approach, this approach was first
adopted by the New York legislature in reaction to the MITE decision. See N.Y. Bus. CORP.
LAW § 912 (McKinney 1986). See Lipman, supra note 4, at S 18. In this article, the author
includes Kansas and Michigan among those states which have adopted the Indiana approach, while Connecticut, Georgia, Pennsylvania and Virginia are included among those
states which have adopted the Delaware approach. Idaho, Nebraska, South Carolina and
Tennessee are identified as having adopted some combination of both approaches. Id.
10. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 203 (1988).
11. See Hayes and Taussig, Tactics of Cash Takeover Bids, 45 HARV. L. Bus. REV. 135
(1967).
12. See Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 430 U.S. 1, 27 (1977). The Court noted that
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tage compared to a potential acquiror in terms of information necessary in making a decision on the merits of a tender offer.13 In
addition, target management was given insufficient time in which
to make recommendations to its shareholders regarding a tender
offer.'
Consequently, in 1968, Congress adopted the Williams Act15 to

remedy the adverse effects caused by this gap in federal securities
regulation.' The purpose of the Act is "to require full and fair
disclosure for the benefit of stockholders while at the same time
providing the offeror and management equal opportunity to fairly
present their case.' 7 In furtherance of this purpose, the Act imposes a number of disclosure and procedural requirements on a
bidder making a tender offer in which five percent or more of a
class of stock registered under section 12 of the 1934 Act is acquired." Specifically, the Act requires a bidder to file disclosure
statements with both the SEC and the target corporation.'
In addition to these disclosure requirements, the Act expands
the rights of tendering shareholders. Initially, the Act allows
tendering shareholders to withdraw their shares during the first
seven days of the offer and at any time after sixty days from the
commencement of the tender-offer.2 0 In addition, if more shares
are tendered than the offeror seeks to purchase, the Act requires
that the tendered shares be purchased from each tendering share"prior to the 1960's, corporate takeover attempts had typically involved either proxy solicitations, regulated under § 14 of the Securities Exchange Act or exchange offers of securities,
subject to the registration requirements of the 1933 Act." Id. Thus, while the Securities Act

of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 required a variety of financial disclosures
for initial public offerings and for the trade of securities on secondary markets, they did not
regulate cash tender offers.
13. Piper, 430 U.S. at 27.
14. BNS, Inc. v. Koppers Co., Inc., 683 F. Supp. 458, 467 (D. Del. 1988). Specifically,
the acquiror was privy to information about the financial condition of the corporation, the
corporation's plans with respect to its business, and various other relevant facts about the
corporation, while the shareholders were not provided with similar information concerning
the acquiror. Id.
15. Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-439, 82 Stat. 454 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(d)-(e),
78n(d)-(f) (1982)).
16. Piper, 430 U.S. at 27.
17. 13 Cong. Rec. 854-55 (1967) (statement of Senator Williams).
18. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(d)-(e), 78n(d)-(f) (1982).
19. Id. § 78m(d)(1). The Act requires the bidder to disclose its identity, background,
the source and amount of funds or other consideration to be used in purchasing the tender
shares, the extent of its holdings in the target corporation, and the bidder's plans with respect to the target corporation's business or corporate structure. Id. § 78n(d)(1).
20. Id. § 78n(d)(5).
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holder on a pro rata basis during the first ten days of the offer. 1
Furthermore, if during the course of the offer the amount paid for
the shares is increased, the Act requires that all tendering shareholders receive the same consideration, even if they tendered their
shares before the price increase was announced.2 2
Following the adoption of the Williams Act, a number of states
enacted more stringent anti-takeover statutes in an attempt to
provide greater protection to their resident corporations and investors.2 3 These statutes placed additional burdens on bidders beyond
the requirements of the Williams Act.24 Consequently, bidders
challenged the constitutionality of these statutes, and many were
struck down by lower federal and state courts on commerce clause
grounds, federal preemption grounds, or both.25
In Edgar v. MITE Corporation,6 the United States Supreme
Court invalidated the Illinois Business Takeover Act, a first generation anti-takeover statute, on commerce clause grounds. 2 7 Justice
White, writing for a majority of the Court 2 held that the Illinois
statute burdened interstate commerce by regulating non-domestic
corporations.2 9 In addition, Justice White concluded that the Wil21.
22.
23.
tics, see

Id. § 78n(d)(6).
Id. § 78n(d)(7).
For a comprehensive analysis of these state statutes and their common characterisWilner & Landy, The Tender Trap: State Takeover Statutes and Their Constitutionality, 45 FORDHAM L. REV. 1 (1976).
24. See Garrett, Third-Generation Anti-Takeover Statutes in Oregon and Indiana
after Dynamics: Target Corporations Control the Ship and Raiders are Foiled, 24 WILLIAMETTE L. REV. 73, 79 (1988) [hereinafter Garrett].
25. Id. See, e.g., Kennecott Corp. v. Smith, 637 F.2d 181, 191 (3d Cir. 1980) (New
Jersey statute unconstitutional on preemption grounds); MITE Corp. v. Dixon, 633 F.2d
486, 500-02 (7th Cir. 1980) (Illinois statute unconstitutional on commerce clause and preemption grounds), aff'd sub nom., Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624 (1982); Great W.
United Corp. v. Kidwell, 577 F.2d 1256, 1279 (5th Cir. 1978) (Idaho statute unconstitutional
on commerce clause and preemption grounds), rev'd on other grounds sub. nom., Leroy v.
Great W. United Corp., 443 U.S. 173 (1979); Crane Co. v. Lam, 509 F. Supp. 782, 786 (E.D.
Pa. 1981) (Pennsylvania statute unconstitutional on preemption grounds); Natomas Co. v.
Bryan, 572 F. Supp. 191, 193 (D. Nev. 1981) (Nevada statute unconstitutional on preemption grounds). But see City Investing Co. v. Sincox, 476 F. Supp. 112 (S.D. Ind. 1979) (Upholding the Indiana statute).
26. 457 U.S. 624 (1982).
27. Id. at 646. Justice White, writing for the majority, found that the Illinois statute
indirectly burdened interstate commerce, and held that the burden imposed outweighed any
legitimate state interests promoted by the statute. Id. at 643-46.
28. The Justices, in fact, filed six separate opinions; however, Justice White's commerce clause analysis was adopted by a majority of the Justices.
29. 457 U.S. at 646. The Illinois statute applied to any corporation which met at least
two of the following three conditions: (1) had its principal office located in Illinois; (2) was
incorporated in Illinois; or (3) had at least 10% of its stated capital or paid in surplus repre-

Anti-Takeover Legislation

1989

725

liams Act preempted the Illinois statute.3 0 In this regard, Justice
White gave a broad preemptive effect to the Williams Act's policy
of offeror-management neutrality. 1 However, only a plurality of
the Court agreed with Justice White's conclusion that the Illinois
statute was preempted by the Williams Act. 2
Following the Supreme Court's decision in MITE, virtually all
other first generation anti-takeover statutes were struck down by
lower federal and state courts. 33 As a result, state legislatures carefully reconstructed their statutes so as to avoid the constitutional
defects of the Illinois statute invalidated in MITE. 4 However, the
MITE decision, with its six separate opinions and only a plurality
opinion on the preemption issue, created uncertainty as to whether
these second generation statutes would withstand constitutional
scrutiny. The United States Supreme Court promptly quelled this
uncertainty with its decision in CTS Corporation v. Dynamics
Corporation of America.sa
III.

CTS

CORPORATION V. DYNAMICS CORPORATION OF AMERICA

In Dynamics, the Supreme Court upheld the constitutional validity of the Indiana Control Share Acquisition Act,36 a second generation anti-takeover statute.3 Under the Indiana Act, any person
sented within Illinois. Id. at 642. In addition, the statute applied to any corporation of
which shareholders located in Illinois owned 10% of the class of stock subject to the tender
offer. Id.
30. Id. at 633-40.
31. Id. Although Justice White recognized that the Williams Act does not expressly
prohibit states from regulating takeovers, he concluded that by providing incumbent management with "powerful tool(s) to combat tender offers," the Illinois statute frustrated the
Act's policy of neutrality between bidder and management. Id. at 635.
32. Only Chief Justice Burger and Justice Blackmun joined in this portion of Justice
White's opinion.
33. See Garrett, supra note 24, at 79 (citing Mesa Petroleum Co. v. Cities Serv. Co.,
715 F.2d 1425 (10th Cir. 1983) (invalidating Oklahoma statute); Martin-Marietta Corp. v.
Bendix Corp., 690 F.2d 558 (6th Cir. 1982) (invalidating Michigan statute); Telvast, Inc. v.
Bradshaw, 697 F.2d 576 (4th Cir. 1982) (invalidating Kentucky statute); Esmark, Inc. v.
Strode, 639 SW.2d 768 (Ky. 1982)). But see Agency Rent-A-Car, Inc. v. Connolly, 686 F.2d
1029 (1st Cir. 1982) (Massachusetts statute survived preemption challenge and no commerce
clause challenge was made).
34. For an interesting discussion regarding the construction of these statutes, see
Note, The Constitutionalityof Second Generation Takeover Statutes, 73 VA. L. REv. 203
(1987).
35. 107 S. Ct. 1637 (1987). The Dynamics decision has been interpreted as ratifying
the ability of a state to statutorily regulate takeover attempts affecting corporations
chartered in that state.
36. IND. CODE ANN. §§ 23-1-42-1 (West Supp. 1987).
37. Prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Dynamics, Control Share Acquisition
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obtaining sufficient shares of an "issuing public corporation"" s so
that his voting interest would pass any of three threshold levels
(20%, 33-1/3 % or 50%) 39 must receive the approval of a majority of
the target's remaining "disinterested" shareholders4 0 before he is
able to vote the controlling block of shares.4 1 If the shares are not
accorded voting rights by the shareholders, the corporation may
redeem the control shares at fair market value.2 Conversely, if the
control shares are granted voting rights, dissenting shareholders
are statutorily entitled to receive the fair value of their shares. s
After reviewing the Indiana Act, the Supreme Court upheld the
Act's validity against both commerce clause and federal preemption challenges. 4 4 Initially, the Court addressed the preemption issue by acknowledging that compliance with both the Williams Act
and the Indiana Act was "entirely possible."' 45 Thus, the only preemption issue present before the Court was whether the Indiana
Act stood "as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of
the full purposes and objectives of Congress."' 6 In this regard, although the Court acknowledged that it was not bound by the plurality opinion in MITE,;7 it nevertheless chose to apply Justice
statutes similar to the Indiana Act had been struck down as unconstitutional. See Fleet
Aerospace Corp. v. Holderman, 637 F. Supp. 742 (S.D. Ohio 1986), aff'd, 796 F.2d 135 (6th
Cir. 1986), vacated, 107 S. Ct. 1949 (1987); APL Ltd. Partnership v. Van Dusen Air, Inc.,
622 F. Supp. 1216 (D. Minn. 1985); Icahn v. Blunt, 612 F. Supp. 1400 (W.D. Mo. 1985). But
see Terry v. Yamashita, 643 F. Supp. 161 (D. Haw. 1986) (Hawaii statute invalidated), rev'd,
788 F.2d 1566 (9th Cir. 1986). However, the Indiana statute was the first such statute to face
constitutional examination in the United States Supreme Court.
38. An "issuing public corporation" is defined as an Indiana corporation that has: (1)
100 or more shareholders; (2) its principal place of business, principal office or substantial
assets within Indiana; and (3) either more than 10% of its shares owned by Indiana residents, or 10,000 shareholders resident in Indiana. See IND. CODE ANN. § 23-1-42-4(a) (West
Supp. 1987).
39. Id. § 23-1-41-1.
40. This shareholder vote is held at the next annual meeting or, if the acquiring person so requests, at a special meeting within 50 days of the request. See Id. § 23-1-42-7.
Officers and directors of the target corporation are not entitled to vote at such meetings. Id.
§ 23-1-42-3.
41. See Langevoort, supra note 5, at 98.
42. Id. See IND. CODE ANN. § 23-1-42-10(b) (West Supp. 1987). In addition, the corporation has the right to redeem the control shares if the acquiror fails to file an acquiring
person statement requesting control status. Id. § 23-1-42-10(a).
43. Id. § 23-1-42-11.
44. CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., 107 S. Ct. 1637, 1639-40 (1987).
45. Id. at 1644.
46. Id. (quoting Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 435 U.S. 151, 158 (1978); Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941)).
47. Id. at 1645.
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White's "broad interpretation of the Williams Act."4' 8 In applying
this analysis, the Court indicated that none of the "offending features" of the Illinois Act identified in MITE"" were present in the
Indiana Act.50 Additionally, the majority concluded that the Indiana Act paralleled one of the essential purposes of the Williams
Act by placing disinterested shareholders "on an equal footing
with the takeover bidder." 51 Consequently, the Court upheld the
constitutional validity of the Indiana act against the federal preemption challenge.5 2
In addition, the majority held that the Indiana statute withstood
a challenge on commerce clause grounds."3 At the outset, the ma48. Id. The Court chose this approach for the sake of argument since it ultimately
concluded that the Indiana Act passed constitutional muster even under the MITE plurality
analysis. Id. However, by choosing this course of analysis, the Court failed to "definitively
establish the preemptive effect" of the Williams Act on state regulation of corporate takeovers. See RP Acquisition Corp. v. Staley Continental, Inc., 686 F. Supp. 476, 481 (D. Del.
1988).
49. In MITE, the plurality identified three provisions of the Illinois statute which
frustrated the principles of the Williams Act. See Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 63440 (1982). The first of these provisions provided for a 20 day precommencement period
within which target management was allowed to present its position on the tender offer to
its shareholders, while the bidder was denied an equivalent opportunity. The MITE plurality concluded that this provision frustrated the Williams Act's policy of offeror-management
neutrality. Id. at 638-39.
The second of these provisions provided that, upon the request of incumbent management, the Secretary of State was to call a hearing with respect to any tender offer subject to
the Illinois Act, with no set deadline for the completion of the hearing. The Act provided
that the offer could not proceed during the pendency of such a hearing. Id. at 637. The
MITE plurality concluded that this provision frustrated Congress' intent to avoid delays
during a tender offer. Id. at 639.
The final provision identified in MITE provided for a review of tender offers by the Illinois Secretary of State to determine the substantive fairness of the offer. The plurality concluded that this provision frustrated Congress' intent that investors be given freedom to
make their own decisions. Id.
50. Dynamics, 107 S. Ct. at 1645. The Court indicated that the Indiana Act: (1) does
not require a precommencement period and gives shareholders equal access to the opinions
of both bidder and target management; (2) requires that a shareholders' meeting be called
within 50 days of the bidder's request; and (3) does not give a state administrative body the
power to review the merits of a tender offer. Id. at 1644-47. See supra note 49.
51. Dynamics, 107 S. Ct. at 1645-46.
52. Id. at 1649. The Court noted that if it were to construe the Williams Act to preempt any state statute which caused delay in the free exercise of power after a successful
tender offer, it would necessarily have to invalidate state statutory provisions which permit
staggered terms for directors or cumulative voting. Id. at 1647-48. In this regard, the Court
indicated that "the longstanding prevalence of state regulation in this area suggests that, if
Congress had intended to preempt all state laws that delay the acquisition of voting control
following a tender offer, it would have said so explicitly." Id. at 1648. Thus, the Court concluded that any delay imposed by the Indiana Act was not unreasonable. Id.
53. Id.
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jority noted that the statute did not discriminate against interstate
commerce because it applied equally to both resident and foreign
bidders. 4 The Court further noted that the statute did not subject
interstate activities to inconsistent regulations because it only applied to domestic corporations.
IV.

5

5

PENNSYLVANIA ANTI-TAKEOVER PROVISIONS

As noted earlier, 56 Pennsylvania's recently enacted anti-takeover
legislation 57 is modeled after the type of statute pioneered in New
York 58 and recently adopted by Delaware.5 9 Although the United
States Supreme Court has not yet passed on the validity of this
type of anti-takeover legislation, the constitutionality of the Delaware statute has been preliminarily upheld by the United States
District Court for the District of Delaware in two recent decisions.6 0 Thus, these decisions may be indicative of how a court
would analyze Pennsylvania's anti-takeover provisions in the face
of a constitutional challenge. However, it is probable that Pennsylvania's provisions will be subject to a higher level of scrutiny due
to their more restrictive nature.
Generally, Pennsylvania's anti-takeover provisions are aimed at
preventing certain "business combinations" 6' between a "regis54. Id. at 1648-49. The Court indicated that "the fact that the burden of a state regulation falls on some interstate companies does not, by itself, establish a claim of discrimination against interstate commerce." Id. at 1649 (citing Exxon Corp. v. Governor of Maryland,
437 U.S. 117, 126 (1978)).
55. Dynamics, 107 S. Ct. at 1649. The majority postulated that "so long as each state
regulated voting rights only in the corporations it has created, each corporation will be subject to the law of only one state." Id.
56. See supra note 9.
57. 15 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 2502, 2513, 2541-2548, 2551-2556 (Purdon Supp. 1989).
58.

See N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW

§

912 (McKinney 1986).

59. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 203 (1988).
60. See BNS, Inc. v. Koppers Co., 683 F. Supp. 458 (D. Del. 1988) and RP Acquisition
Corp. v. Staley Continental, Inc., 686 F. Supp. 476 (D. Del. 1988). In both of these cases, the
district court applied the analysis of the United States Supreme Court in Dynamics in finding that the Delaware statute was not preempted by the Williams Act and did not impermissibly interfere with interstate commerce in violation of the commerce clause.
61. The term "business combination" includes any of the following:
(1) A merger or consolidation of the corporation or any subsidiary of the corporation
with:
(i) The interested shareholder; or
(ii) Any other corporation (whether or not itself an interested shareholder of the
registered corporation) which is, or after the merger of consolidation would be, an
affiliate or associate of the interested shareholder.
(2) A sale, lease, exchange, mortgage, pledge, transfer or other disposition (in one
transaction or a series of transactions) to or with the interested shareholder or any
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tered corporation" ' and an "interested shareholder,"'

3

or any "af-

affiliate or associate of such interested shareholder of assets of the corporation or any
subsidiary of the corporation:
(i) Having an aggregate market value equal to 10% or more of the aggregate market
value of all the assets, determined on a consolidated basis, of such corporation;
(ii) Having an aggregate market value equal to 10% or more of the aggregate market
value of all the outstanding shares of such corporation; or net income, determined on
a consolidated basis,of such corporation.
(iii) Representing 10% or more of the earning power or net income, determined on a
consolidated basis, of such corporation.
(3) The issuance or transfer by the corporation or any subsidiary of the corporation
(in one transaction or a series of transactions) of any shares of such corporation or
any subsidiary of such corporation which has an aggregate market value equal to 5%
or more of the aggregate market value of all the outstanding shares of the corporation
to the interested shareholder or any affiliate or associate of such interested shareholder except pursuant to the exercise of option rights to purchase shares, or pursuant to the conversion of securities having conversion rights, offered, or a dividend or
distribution paid or made, pro rata to all shareholders of the corporation.
(4) The adoption of any plan or proposal for the liquidation or dissolution of the
corporation proposed by, or pursuant to any agreement, arrangement or understanding (whether or not in writing) with, the interested shareholder or any affiliate or
associate of such interested shareholder.
(5) A reclassification of securities (including, without limitation, any split of shares,
dividend of shares, or other distribution of shares in respect of shares, or any reverse
split of shares), or recapitalization of the corporation, or any merger or consolidation
of the corporation with any subsidiary of the corporation, or any other transaction
(whether or not with or into or otherwise involving the interested shareholder), proposed by, or pursuant to any agreement, arrangement or understanding (whether or
not in writing) with, the interested shareholder or any affiliate or associate of the
interested shareholder, which has the effect, directly or indirectly, of increasing the
proportionate share of the outstanding shares of any class or series of voting shares or
securities convertible into voting shares of the corporation or any subsidiary of the
corporation which is, directly or indirectly, owned by the interested shareholder or
any affiliate or associate of the interested shareholder, except as a result of immaterial changes due to fractional share adjustments.
(6) The receipt by the interested shareholder or any affiliate or associate of the interested shareholder of the benefit, directly or indirectly (except proportionately as a
shareholder of such corporation), of any loans, advances, guarantees, pledges or other
financial assistance or any tax credits or other tax advantages provided by or through
the corporation.
15 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2554 (Purdon Supp. 1989).
62. A "registered corporation" is defined as:
(1) A domestic business corporation (incorporated in Pennsylvania):
(i) Having a class or series of shares entitled to vote generally in the election of directors of the corporation registered under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15
U.S.C. § 78A et seq.); or
(ii) Subject to the reporting obligations imposed by section 13 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. § 78m) by reason of having filed a registration statement under the Securities Act of 1933 (15 U.S.C. § 77A et seq.) relating to shares of a
class or series of its equity securities.
Id. § 2502. However, the anti-takeover provisions discussed herein pertain only to those
registered corporations described in § 2502(1)(i). See generally 15 PA. CoNs. STAT. ANN. §
2551 (Purdon Supp. 1989).
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filiate"" or "associate" 5 of such shareholder, from taking effect for
a period of five years,68 unless certain requirements are satisfied.
Like the Delaware statute,67 these provisions affect a number of
significant corporate transactions, including mergers and sales of
assets, and, in certain circumstances, the issuance of stock, rights,
options and other benefits by a corporation. Thus, it is necessary
to recognize which persons 9 and transactions are subject to these
70
provisions.
63. Id. § 2553(a). An "interested shareholder" is defined as:
(1) the beneficial owner, directly or indirectly, of shares entitling that person to cast
at least 20% of the votes that all shareholders would be entitled to cast in an election
of directors of the corporation; or
(2) an affiliate or associate of such corporation and at any time within the five-year
period immediately prior to the date in questions was the beneficial owner, directly or
indirectly, of share entitling that person to cast at least 20% of the votes that all
shareholders would be entitled to cast in an election of directors of the corporation.
Id.
64. An "affiliate" is defined as a person that directly, or indirectly through one or
more intermediaries, controls, or is controlled by, or is under common control with, a specified person. Id. § 2552 (definition of "affiliate").
65. An "associate," when used to indicate a relationship with any person, is defined as:
(1) Any corporation or organization of which such person is an officer, director or
partner or is, directly or indirectly, the beneficial owner of shares entitling that person to cast at least 10% of the votes that all shareholders would be entitled to cast in
an election of directors of the corporation or organization;
(2) Any trust or other estate in which such person has a substantial beneficial interest
or as to which such person serves as trustee or in a similar fiduciary capacity; and
(3) Any relative or spouse of such person, or any relative of the spouse, who has the
same home as such person.
Id. (definition of "associate").
66. Id. See generally 15 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2555 (Purdon Supp. 1989).
67. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 203(c)(3) (1988). See R.F. Balotti & J. Finkelstein, The
Delaware Law of Corporationsand Business Organizations,§ 6.21D (1988).
68. See supra note 61 and accompanying text.
69. The term "person(s)," as used herein, refers to a corporation as well as to an individual. Thus, the term will often be succeeded by the pronoun "it."
70. At this point, it is important to note that a corporation is entitled to exempt itself
from the application of those provisions relating to business combinations by either:
(1) Including a provision in the original articles of incorporation which explicitly provides that such provisions are not applicable to the corporation; or
(2) Adopting an article amendment pursuant to both the procedures then applicable
to the corporation and the affirmative vote of a majority of the voting shares (excluding the voting shares held by interested shareholders, their affiliates and associates)
which expressly exempts the corporation from the application of such provisions.
15 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2551(b)(3)(ii)(A), (B) (Purdon Supp. 1989). However, an amendment to the articles is not effective until 18 months after its adoption and does not apply to
any business combination of the corporation with an interested shareholder who acquired its
shares on or prior to the effective date of the amendment. This prevents an interested
shareholder from obtaining proxies or written consents sufficient to amend the articles to
opt out immediately prior to the consummation of a business combination with the corporation. Corporations which adopted bylaw amendments within 90 days of the effective date of
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An "interested shareholder" is defined, in general terms, as a
person who is the beneficial owner of at least twenty percent71 of a
registered corporation's voting stock. 2 In this regard, a person
beneficially "owns" stock when such person, individually or together with (or through) any of its affiliates"1 or associates, " possesses any of the following:
(1) direct or indirect beneficial ownership of such stock;7 5 or
(2) the right to acquire such stock through any agreement, arrangement or
understanding, or upon the exercise of conversion or exchange rights, warrants or options, but not until such shares are accepted for purchase or exchange;76' or
(3) the right to vote such shares pursuant to any agreement, arrangement,
or understanding, unless the right to vote such shares arises solely from a
revocable proxy or consent given in response to a proxy or consent solicitation made under the Exchange Act; or
(4) an agreement, arrangement or understanding for the purpose of acquiring, holding, voting or disposing of such stock with any other person who
beneficially owns such stock directly or through its affiliates or associates.7"

However, there are a number of circumstances in which a person
may, in fact, own twenty percent or more of the voting shares of a
corporation and still not be subject to the anti-takeover provisions.
For instance, the provisions do not apply to any shareholder who
becomes an interested shareholder inadvertently, provided that
such shareholder: (1) as soon as practicable, divests itself of a sufficient amount of voting shares so that it no longer is the beneficial
owner of twenty percent of the corporation's voting shares; and (2)
but for the inadvertent acquisition, would not have been an interested shareholder at any time within a five-year period preceding
the Act (by June 21, 1988), which explicitly provided that these provisions are not applicable, are also exempt from such provisions, if such bylaw amendment has not been subsequently rescinded by either an article amendment or a bylaw amendment approved by at
least 85% of the board of directors. Id. § 2551(b)(3)(i). In addition, registered corporations
described in § 2502(1)(ii) are automatically exempt from the application of such provisions.
Id. § 2551(b)(1). See supra note 61.
71. Under Delaware law, the interested shareholder threshold is set at 15%. See DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 203(c)(5) (1988).
72. See supra note 63 and accompanying text.
73. See supra note 64 and accompanying text.
74. See supra note 65 and accompanying text.
75. In this context, beneficial ownership is not further defined.
76. It is significant to note that the mere right to acquire stock is deemed to be ownership of such stock regardless of whether the right is immediately exercisable or whether it
may be exercised only after a certain time has passed.
77. 15 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2552 (Purdon Supp. 1989) (definition of "beneficial
owner"). This section is identical to the comparable section contained in the Delaware statute. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 203(c)(8) (1988).
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the announcement date of any business combination between itself
and the corporation. 78 In addition, these provisions are inapplicable to any interested shareholder who was the beneficial owner of
at least fifteen percent of the voting shares of the corporation on
March 23, 1988, and who continues to own such shares up to the
time it becomes an interested shareholder.7 9 Furthermore, in deter-

mining the percentage of voting shares beneficially owned by a
shareholder, the following shares are excluded: (1) shares which
the shareholder has held continuously since January 1, 1983;80 (2)

shares held by the shareholder which were acquired solely by gift,
inheritance, bequest, devise or other testamentary distribution, directly or indirectly, from a person who had acquired such shares
prior to January 1, 1983;11 and (3) shares acquired pursuant to a
stock split, stock dividend, reclassification or similar recapitalization which have been held continuously since their issuance by the
shareholder, or by another person from whom the shares were acquired pursuant to a transaction described in (2) above.82
As a general rule, once a person obtains the status of "interested
shareholder," it may not effectuate any "business combination" 3
between itself and the issuing (registered) corporation for a period
of up to five years, 4 unless one of three exceptions is satisfied.,
Initially, an interested shareholder is permitted to effectuate a business combination with a registered corporation if such business
combination is approved by the board of directors of the corporation prior to the time the person becomes an interested shareholder.8 ' Similarly, a business combination will be exempt from the
15 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2551(b)(4)(i), (ii) (Purdon Supp. 1989).
79. Id. § 2551(b)(5). Note that this "grandfather" provision applies only to the stockholder and not to the stock itself. Thus, if the owner of such shares transfers them to another, the transferee may become subject to the provisions if he subsequently acquires suffi78.

cient additional shares to become an interested shareholder. Id.
80.
81.
82.

Id. § 2553(b)(2)(i).
Id. § 2553(b)(2)(ii).
Id,§ 2553(b)(2)(iii).

83. See supra note 61 and accompanying text.
84. Delaware only provides for a three year "moratorium" in which business combinations may not be effectuated between an interested shareholder and its issuing corporation.
See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 203(a)(1988).
85. See generally 15 PA. CoNs. STAT. ANN. § 2555 (Purdon Supp. 1989). It must be
emphasized that interested shareholders are not statutorily precluded from exercising various other rights of controlling stock ownership. Thus, such shareholders are not precluded
from: (1) making tender offers directly to the stockholders; (2) making market purchases of
additional shares; (3) electing their own board of directors; or (4) entering into a business
combination with an unrelated party.
86. Id. § 2555(1).
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general rule if the board approved of the person becoming an in87
terested shareholder prior to the time he obtained such status.
However, this exception is almost certain to be absent in the context of a hostile takeover. Thus, the interested shareholder will frequently be left with just two narrow exceptions to the five year
"moratorium" imposed by the general rule. More importantly, it is
these two exceptions which distinguish Pennsylvania's anti-takeover provisions from the Delaware statute in terms of restraint on
the bidder/interested shareholder.
The first of these two latter exceptions can only be satisfied if
the interested shareholder: (1) acquires beneficial ownership of at
least eighty percent of all of the corporation's voting shares (including shares owned by management and employee stock plans)
in compliance with certain "fair price" standards;"8 (2) waits for a
period of at least three months; and (3) thereafter, while still beneficially owning such shares, receives approval of the proposed business combination by a majority of the corporation's disinterested
shareholders.8 9 This exception differs from the comparable Delaware provision which provides that a business combination is not
subject to the Delaware statute's three-year moratorium if the
shareholder acquires eighty-five percent or more of the corporation's outstanding voting stock in the same transaction by which
such shareholder becomes an interested shareholder.9 0
Although, at first glance, it may appear that Pennsylvania's
eighty percent requirement is more lenient than Delaware's eightyfive percent threshold, it must be noted that Delaware excludes
from its eighty-five percent calculation shares owned by management and shares held in employee stock plans which do not provide participants the opportunity to tender shares on a confidential basis. 91 Thus, upon further inspection, Pennsylvania's
requirement can be much more stringent. This is made abundantly
more clear by the fact that an eighty percent shareholder in Pennsylvania must still get the approval of a majority of the disinter87. Id. This section is virtually identical to Delaware's § 203(a)(1). See DEL. CODE ANN.
tit. 8, § 203(a)(1)(1988).
88. See 15 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2556 (Purdon Supp. 1989).
89. Id. § 2555(2)(i). See Lipman, supra note 4, at S.19. The author points out that if
former management owns more than 10% of the outstanding voting shares of the corporation, it still has the power to block a business combination with the interested shareholder
for at least five years, regardless of whether or not such shareholder acquired 80% or more
of the voting shares. Id.
90. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 203(a)(2)(1988).
91. Id.
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ested shareholders to enable it to effectuate a business combination, while no comparable restriction is placed on an eighty-five
percent shareholder in Delaware.2
The final exception available to the interested shareholder is satisfied only if the business combination is approved by one hundred
percent of the corporation's outstanding common shares. 3 This exception is in sharp contrast to Delaware's comparable provision,
which permits business combinations with an interested shareholder if they are approved by both the board of directors of the
corporation and the holders of two-thirds of the corporation's outstanding voting stock."' Although the Delaware statute requires
prior board approval before the disinterested shareholders may
vote, there is nothing preventing the interested shareholder from
changing the composition of the board to ensure its approval.
Thus, when viewed in this context, Pennsylvania's one hundred
percent vote requirement is clearly more restrictive than Delaware's two-thirds requirement.
In addition to its more restrictive requirements, Pennsylvania's
statute also permits disinterested shareholders to continue to block
any business combination with an interested shareholder, beyond
the five year freeze period, if the interested shareholder fails to
comply with certain "fair price" provisions.9 5 This differs from the
Delaware statute, which does not provide any means by which the
three-year waiting period may be extended, and does not contain
any fair price provisions during or after such three year period.96
V.

CONSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS

Since it is clear that Pennsylvania's anti-takeover provisions are
similar to, yet in some respects much more stringent than, Delaware's statute, a question arises as to whether such provisions

would survive constitutional scrutiny under the analysis provided
by the Supreme Court in Dynamics and adopted by the Delaware
district court in BNS, Incorporatedv. Koppers Company97 and RP
92. See supra note 88-90 and accompanying text.
93. 15 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2555(2)(ii) (Purdon Supp. 1989).
94. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 203(a)(3)(1988). For purposes of calculating the two-thirds
threshold, shares held by the interested shareholder are excluded, while shares held by man-

agement and shares held in the employee stock plans are included. Id.
95. See 15 PA. CoNs. STAT. ANN. §§ 2555(4) and 2556 (Purdon Supp. 1989).
96. See Lipman, supra note 4, at S.19.
97.

683 F. Supp. 458 (D. Del. 1988). See supra note 60.
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Acquisition Corporation v. Staley Continental, Incorporated."
Thus, the following is an illustration of how a district court (or
even the Supreme Court) might analyze Pennsylvania's anti-takeover provisions in the face of a constitutional challenge on both
federal preemption and commerce clause grounds."'
A.

Preemption Analysis

The Delaware district court in Koppers based its preemption
analysis on the following premise: "[E]ven statutes with substantial deterrent effects on tender offers do not circumvent Williams
Act goals, so long as hostile offers which are beneficial to target
shareholders have a meaningful opportunity for success."' 0 The
court went on to note that a state statute will be preempted only if
it "frustrates the full purposes and objectives of Congress."1 °1 In
this regard, the district court applied the following four part analysis: (1) whether the statute protects disinterested shareholders
from coercion; (2) whether the statute gives either management or
the offeror an advantage in communicating with the shareholders;
(3) whether the statute imposes an indefinite or unreasonable delay on offers; and (4) whether the statute allows the state govern10 2
ment to review the fairness of an offer.
Since both Pennsylvania's and Delaware's statutes are specifically designed to delay the acquisition of full control of a corporation for a period of years after a successful tender offer, 0 3 the
court's treatment of the third part of the above analysis is of primary importance.10 ' In this regard, the court first noted that the
statute does not impose any delay on the actual purchase of
98. 686 F. Supp. 476 (D. Del. 1988).
99. This exercise will be based primarily on the Delaware district court's interpretation of the Supreme Court's analysis in Dynamics, since it applied this analysis to the type
of statute adopted in Pennsylvania.
100. Koppers, 683 F. Supp. at 469 (citing Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 430 U.S. 1
(1977); Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624 (1982) and CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp., 107 S.
Ct. 1637 (1987)). See also Staley Continental, 686 F. Supp. at 482.
101. Koppers, 683 F. Supp. at 469 (citing Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941)).
102. Id. (citing CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., 107 S. Ct. 1637, 1646 (1987)).
103. See supra notes 61 and 83.
104. The court summarily disposed of the second and fourth inquiries as they were
found to be either inapplicable (in the case of the fourth inquiry) or incapable of undergoing
sufficient analysis due to the newness of the Delaware statute (in the case of the second
inquiry). As to the first inquiry, the court concluded that the statute does offer protection to
disinterested shareholders by eliminating freeze-outs or post-tender offer mergers between
the offeror and the corporation. See Koppers, 683 F. Supp. at 469-70. These same conclusions are equally applicable to Pennsylvania's provisions.
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shares."0 5 The court then turned its attention to the three year
freeze period imposed by the Delaware statute and noted that the
Delaware practice of staggering the terms of directors, alone, may
delay shifts of control for up to two years.106 Thus, the district
court concluded that the additional one year delay imposed by
Delaware's anti-takeover statute, by itself, "is not troublesome for
preemption purposes1107
However, it is apparent from the district court's reasoning in
this regard that had the court been faced with a five year freeze
statute similar to Pennsylvania's it very possibly could have
reached the opposite conclusion.10 8 This is especially true considering that the Pennsylvania statute, unlike the Delaware statute,
provides a means by which the five year freeze period may be extended by a majority vote of disinterested shareholders.109 Thus, it
is conceivable that a court, applying reasoning similar to that of
the Delaware district court, may conclude that Pennsylvania's
freeze provisions frustrate the purposes and objectives of the Williams Act by imposing an indefinite or unreasonable delay on an
offeror.
After concluding that Delaware's three-year freeze period is not
overly burdensome, the district court proceeded to examine the
statutory exceptions to the Delaware statute. The court prefaced
this examination by stating that the statute will be constitutional
(for preemption purposes) "so long as it does not prevent an ap105. Id.
106. Id. Delaware permits a corporation to divide its board of directors into as many
as three classes: the first class to be reelected after one year; the second class to be reelected
after two years; and the third class to be reelected after three years. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit.
8, § 141(d) (1988). At each reelection, directors are to be chosen for a full term (three years
if three classes are adopted), and such directors may not be removed without cause before
their terms expire. Id. § 141(k). Thus, the term of each class will continue to expire in
staggered fashion, ultimately causing a delay in the time a successful offeror may obtain
control of the board up to a period of two years (the time it would take for an offeror to
elect two thirds of the board).
Pennsylvania allows staggered terms of up to four years. See 15 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §
1724(b) (Purdon Supp. 1989). Thus, an offeror in Pennsylvania may be subject to a delay of
up to three years before he may obtain control of the board. The United States Supreme
Court has implicitly upheld such common state practices as permitting corporations to stagger the terms of their directors. See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
107. Id.
108. Since Pennsylvania's statute relating to staggered terms allows a potential delay
of up to three years, see supra note 106, its five-year freeze period provides for an additional
two year delay, which may have been viewed as "troublesome" by the Delaware district
court.
109. See supra note 95 and accompanying text.
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preciable number of hostile bidders from navigating the statutory
exceptions."1 10 The district court then focused its examination primarily on the statutory exception pertaining to acquirors of eightyfive percent of the outstanding voting shares of the corporation."1
Although noting that this exception "may place a heavy burden on
the offeror hoping to consummate the transaction despite the opposition of management,"'' 2 the court concluded that it was "not
prepared to rule on the appropriate percentage of post-tender ownership required to insulate minority shareholders from coercive
two-tier bids in the absence of facts refuting the state's determination" of the eighty-five percent threshold.' Thus, the court had
no alternative but to conclude that the eighty-five percent exception gives hostile offerors a meaningful opportunity to obtain full
control despite management opposition." 4
Given the lack of analysis applied by the district court in this
regard, it is difficult to predict how a court would analyze Pennsylvania's comparable eighty percent requirement. However, it is
abundantly clear that Pennsylvania's requirement is much more
restrictive than Delaware's eighty-five percent requirement, since
Pennsylvania includes all outstanding shares in calculating the re110. BNS, Inc. v. Koppers Co., 683 F. Supp. 458, 470 (D. Del. 1988). This concern
mirrors the court's underlying premise that hostile offers must have a meaningful opportunity for success. See supra note 100 and accompanying text.
111. Koppers, 683 F. Supp. at 470-71. See supra note 90 and accompanying text. The
court dismissed the first exception pertaining to prior board approval by noting that such
approval is necessarily absent in the context of a hostile takeover. 683 F. Supp. at 470.
112. Koppers, 683 F. Supp. at 470-71.
113. Id. Subsequently, in RP Acquisition Corp. v. Staley Continental, 686 F. Supp.
476 (D. Del. 1988), the Delaware district court was presented with an abundance of statistical evidence designed to show that the 85% exception is illusory because (1) hostile offers
have historically failed to achieve 85% ownership, and (2) generally, at least 16% of a corporation's voting shares are held by shareholders who are blindly pro-management or who are
completely non-responsive to corporate communication (so-called "dead shares"). Id. at 482.
In response to the first assertion, the court noted that the statistical evidence proffered by
the plaintiff referred to 85% ownership of all stock, whereas Delaware's statute excludes
stock owned by management and stock held by employee stock plans. Id. at 483. Accordingly, the court determined that such statistics overstated the difficulty of obtaining 85%
ownership, and thus, adopted the same wait-and-see approach as it did in Koppers. Id.
In response to the second assertion, the court noted that when the Delaware statute was
adopted, the SEC Commissioner had calculated the common percentage of dead shares to
be about five percent. In addition, the court discounted statistics showing that anywhere
from 9.45% to 21.2% of shares are commonly owned by officers and/or directors, since the
Delaware statute excludes shares owned by management and the plaintiff had not indicated
how many of these officers and/or directors were, in fact, management. Id. Based on the
above, the court concluded that "hostile offers retain a meaningful opportunity for success
under the 85 percent exception." Id.
114. Id.
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quired percentage and, in addition, requires the majority approval
of the remaining disinterested shareholders. " 5 Thus, it is foreseeable that a court may find these restrictions too prohibitive in light
of the basic premise that hostile offerors be afforded a meaningful
opportunity for success.
Finally, the district court concluded that Delaware's third exception pertaining to board approval and the approval of two-thirds of
the disinterested shareholders (including management) "might
well be illusory."'1 6 Given this conclusion, it is not beyond reason
that Pennsylvania's comparable one hundred percent approval requirement" 7 would be susceptible to similar treatment.
B.

Commerce Clause Analysis

The Delaware district court in Koppers analyzed the Delaware
statute's compliance with the commerce clause by using the following three-part test: (1) are the effects of the statute discriminatory?; (2) does the statute create an impermissible risk of inconsistent regulation?; and (3) does the statute promote stable corporate
relationships and protect shareholders?" 8 Analyzing Pennsylvania's provisions in view of these tests, it is clear that such provisions: (1) do not discriminate between offerors which are Pennsylvania corporations and offerors which are non-Pennsylvania
corporations;" 9 (2) do not create a risk of inconsistent regulation; 0 and (3) are designed to protect shareholders and inherently
promote corporate relations by preventing many adverse effects associated with hostile takeovers.' 2 ' Although this undoubtedly appears to be a summary analysis, this is, in fact, the approach most
likely to be applied by a court when analyzing Pennsylvania's antitakeover provisions on commerce clause grounds."2
115. See supra note 89 and accompanying text.
116. 683 F. Supp. at 471-72.
117. See supra note 93 and accompanying text.
118. 683 F. Supp. at 472 (citing CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., 107 S. Ct. 1637,
1648-52 (1987)).
119. As the United States Supreme Court stated in Dynamics: "[N]o principle of corporate law is more firmly established than a State's authority to regulate domestic corporations .. " Dynamics, 107 S. Ct. at 1649.
120. See supra note 55 and accompanying text.
121. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
122. See, e.g., Koppers, 683 F. Supp. at 472-73; Staley Continental, 686 F. Supp. at
487-88. In Koppers, for instance, the court summarily applied the three-part test to the
Delaware statute as follows: Under the first part, the court simply concluded that "(s)ection
203 does not discriminate between offeror's which are Delaware corporations and offerors
which are not incorporated here." 683 F. Supp. at 472. Under the second part, the court
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CONCLUSION

Pennsylvania's newly enacted anti-takeover provisions are
designed primarily to protect shareholders from coercion in tender
offers. In this context, the provisions are consistent with the purposes and provisions of the Williams Act. However, the restrictiveness of these provisions will undoubtedly cause them to be subject
to both criticism, by those who believe corporate takeovers to be
beneficial to the economy, and heightened judicial scrutiny, in the
realm of constitutional analysis.
Certainly, Pennsylvania's anti-takeover provisions constitute
some of the most aggressive statutes to be thrown into the arena of
state anti-takeover legislation. Nevertheless, it remains to be seen
just how far states will be allowed to go in terms of regulating corporate takeover activity before Congress, once again, decides to
step into the arena as well.
Frank Fogl

merely stated that "(t)he fact that a vast majority of Delaware's corporations do not have
their main office in Delaware or many resident shareholders does not prevent Delaware from
regulating tender offers affecting these corporations and does not inevitably create a risk of
inconsistent regulation." Id. Under the third part, the court summarily concluded that "the
Delaware statute both promotes stable corporate relationships and protects shareholders."
Id. at 473.

